The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy

By Jacques E. C. Hymans

New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 273 pp. ISBN 0-521-61625-5

Reviewed by Hal S. Bertilson

Hal S. Bertilson, Department of Human Behavior and Diversity, University of Wisconsin-Superior, Belknap & Catlin, PO Box 2000, Superior, WI 54880, E-mail: hbertils@uwsuper.edu

In my course on Interpersonal, Community, and Global Violence 317, I like to begin my lectures on terrorism from Reich's (1990) edited book Origins of Terrorism. The first chapter gives a logical, rational explanation of terrorism pointing out where rational choice theory applies and its advantages and shortcomings. This first chapter is a counterpoint to all other chapters which give psychological explanations of terrorism. Such an editorial strategy emphasizes the critical value of psychological approaches. The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation similarly emphasizes psychological over a rational-choice perspective.

Jacques Hymans observed, what I have suspected and feared, that policy decision makers have overrelied on rational explanations to the exclusion of psychological approaches. While Hymans' theoretical and empirical narrative is tightly focused on the domain of nuclear proliferation. I believe his theory of leader perceptions and emotions may have wide applicability to other domains such as decisions about preventive wars, to which the author alludes, and to such other national priority decision-making as decisions to go to war and programs to alleviate poverty.

While apparently not a direct descendent, Hyman's approach has some elements in common with Fiedler's (1978) contingency theory of leadership. Whereas Fiedler's system predicts in what situations a task-oriented or a relationship-oriented leader is most effective, Hymans' system predicts whether a leader will or will not take his country nuclear based upon a typology of leader characteristics. The typology in this case is one of a leader's understanding of the nation's identity. Drawing from the social psychology literature, two dimensions are posited.

The key individual variable is the national leader's individual understanding of the nation's identity vis-à-vis a key comparison other. Two dimensions define this key variable, what Hymans calls national identity conceptions. The status dimension refers to how we compare to a specific other. Are we the equal to the other or are we naturally less than the other? Leaders who see their nations as equal to key comparison-other nations are called "nationalists." These leaders are motivated by pride. Leaders who do not see themselves as equal to key comparison others are labeled "subaltern."

The second dimension is the solidarity dimension. Those leaders who see their nation in starkly "us vs. them" dichotomy vis-à-vis a key comparison-other are known as "oppositional" leaders and are motivated by fear. Those leaders who do not see their nation in oppositional terms--they see their nation as part of larger community of nations-- are described as "sportsmanlike." From this analysis Hymans predicts that oppositional nationalist leaders will be motivated to acquire the nuclear bomb. Oppositional subaltern, sportsmanlike nationalist, and sportsmanlike subaltern leaders will not be motivated to acquire the bomb.

To test his theory Hymans conducted content analyses of leaders' major public speeches and supplemented these analyses with other published sources. The leaders of four countries were evaluated in this way. The speeches of Australian prime ministers were evaluated from 1945 to 1975. The state of union addresses of presidents of Argentina were evaluated from 1966 to 2006. The speeches of prime ministers of India were reviewed from 1947 to 2004. The speeches of prime ministers of France were reviewed from 1944 to 1955. Discussion of these analyses in the context of the nations actual decision making seemed thorough and supportive of Hymans' theory "in spite of vast differences in the geographical, temporal, and political contexts of the four country cases" (p. 204).

Furthermore Hymans' research led to a number of attractive conclusions, i.e., "lessons for policy." As predicted, the case studies revealed many telltale signs of emotional decision making. Such emotions did shape the information leaders attended to and their willingness to choose the bomb. The theory elaborated in The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation was useful in explaining how leaders made decisions as well as which leaders were predisposed toward making the choice for developing the bomb. Too, the theory was a good predictor of leaders' willingness to join the non-proliferation regime, their desire for nuclear technological autonomy, and their pursuit of a superpower guarantees against potential external threats. The author has shown, too, that different leaders from the same country and different leaders from the same party can have very different national identity comparisons and therefore different nuclear policy preferences. "The sources of these differences are in the individuals, not in the external structure. In short, if we wish to understand the decisions to acquire nuclear weapons, an analysis of individual leaders is simply unavoidable" (p. 208).

Hymans continues with a discussion of the implications of the theory by showing how some common myths are inadequate and misleading. He has shown that the nuclear proliferation version of the domino theory is oversimplified and he argues that the worldwide reliance on zero-tolerance is misguided. The author shows that the belief by policy-makers that states want the bomb because it is a great deterrent is over relied upon. Some leaders in these case histories saw the acquisition of the bomb as increasing their vulnerability and risk rather than strengthening it. Some see the bomb as risking the initiation of a costly arms race.

Not all states see the bomb as a means to enhance international status, what Hymans called the "great power game" (p. 211). Even those leaders who seek international prestige do not necessarily view the bomb as the most effective strategy to obtain that prestige. In fact some cases, such as India at a time before Atal Behari Vajpayee became prime minister, more international prestige was gained by abstaining from the bomb.

While speculation might lead to a "Dr. Strangelove" theory of proliferation, Hymans' analysis of case histories shows that nuclear bureaucrats who want to build the bomb cannot substantially move in that direction without political direction and support from the prime minister or president. Consistent with Hymans' emphasis on the individual decision maker, the cases show that decisions to go nuclear were not the result of consensus among councils and other parties in governing coalitions. Strikingly, leaders began their progression towards building the bomb in secret sharing their intent with few others.

Another myth Hymans addresses is that the international non-proliferation regime is the essential mechanism "protecting the world from a cascade of new nuclear weapons states" (p. 214). While the non-proliferation regime has had a deterrent effect in some cases, it has been counterproductive in others. Tough normative pressures on sportsmanlike nationalist leaders actually contributed directly to the building of secret Argentinean and Indian bomb-making capabilities. Hymans concluded that the non-proliferation regime has had great utility in monitoring the pace of nuclear technological diffusion, but it has not been instrumental in preventing proliferation.

Lessons for intelligence analyses are also proposed. Repeated U.S. intelligence failures, for example, have been attributed by review panels to the inability of U.S. intelligence community to "think through how the other guy thought" (p. 216). U.S. intelligence failures such as the inability to anticipate India's May 1998 nuclear test series and its erroneous understanding of Saddam Hussein weapons program were attributed to the U.S. "engineering approach" in foreign policy: the tendency of U.S. intelligence community to "try to boil down political problems to technical ones" (p. 217). This book argues that the best way to start understanding nuclear intentions is with policy declarations by the leaders themselves. That conclusion does not mean that we should necessarily believe peaceful declarations of intent. Leaders can and do lie. But to understand statements of intent within the context of a nations history and through systematic, multimethod approaches are important. Furthermore it is the linkages from identity to emotions to policy choice that is key.

In terms of international policy, Hymans argues for more flexible non-proliferation regime which allows states to design their own bi-laterial or regional non-proliferation initiatives. Furthermore, Hymans cautions against intense international non-proliferation efforts which can have the paradoxical effect of increasing the perceived importance of being a nuclear state.

Rather than seek a stricter international non-proliferation regime, or seek nuclear abolition, or initiate preventive wars; Hymans argues that we need to find ways to decrease demand, for example, by broadening the "circle of decision making" over the nuclear issue and to prod domestic political actors keep oppositional nationalists out of nuclear decision making opportunities.

That individual differences is important in the field of nuclear decision making, is consistent with the importance of individual differences in the field of the psychology of aggression (e.g., Bertilson, 1991; Geen, 2001). In an age where threat from nuclear bombs is increasing from non-state actors, i.e., terrorists, Hymans emphasis on understanding the perceptions and emotions of leaders is particularly important.

The urgent need to use as many approaches as possible, including psychological analyses, in controlling the nuclear risk was emphasized recently when the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the Doomsday Clock two minutes closer to nuclear midnight. "The decision to change the clock came from the bulletin's board of sponsors, a group of scientists and policymakers that includes 18 Nobel laureates" (Williamson, January 18, 2007, A12). Reasons cited for the change in the clock to 11:55 PM include North Korea's nuclear bomb test, Iran's nuclear plans, and atomic energy projects intended to answer climate change, poor safeguards of nuclear materials. The Clock is now set closest to doomsday it has been since the cold War.

References

Bertilson, H. S. (1991). Aggression. In W. Jones, B. A. Winstead, & V. J. Derlega. (Eds.), Personality: Contemporary Theory and Research (pp. 457-480). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Crenshaw, M. (1990). The logic of terrorism: Terrorist behavior as a product of strategic choice. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind (pp. 7-24). New York: Cambridge.

Fiedler, F. (1978). The contingency model and the dynamics of the leadership process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology: Vol 11 (pp. 59-112). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.

Geen, R. G. (2001). Human aggression 2nd ed.). Buckingham: Open University Press.

Reich, W. (Ed.) Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind. New York: Cambridge.

Williamson, E. (2007, January 18). Two minutes closer to doomsday: Scientists change symbolic clock to recognize new dangers. The Washington Post, p. A12.

Biography of Reviewer

After completing his Ph.D. at Washington State University, Hal Bertilson has held academic and administrative positions at six different universities. He came to the University of Wisconsin-Superior as Vice Chancellor in 1993 and is currently serving as Professor of Psychology in the Department of Human Behavior and Diversity and Coordinator for Psychology. His research has been in the areas of aggression, delay of aversive choices, and poverty. He has received university-wide teaching, research, and service awards and is the Wisconsin Teaching Scholar for the University of Wisconsin-Superior for 2007-2008. He is also Coordinator for the Duluth-Superior Amnesty International Group #642.