Post, J. M. (1990). Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces. In W. Reich (Ed.) Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, states of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press, 25-40.
1.	The principal argument of psycho-logic
	a.	Individuals are drawn to the path of terrorism in order to commit acts of violence.
	b.	J. M. Post takes issue with the argument that terrorists resort to violence as a willful choice.
	c.	Post takes issue with the argument that terrorist acts are an intentional choice selected from a range of perceived alternatives.
	d.	Political terrorists are driven to commit acts of violence as a consequence of psychological forces.
	e.	Political terrorists "construct" a special psycho-logic to rationalize acts that they are psychologically compelled to commit.
	f.	Their special logic becomes the justification for their violent acts.
2.	The rhetoric of terrorists
	a.	The rhetoric of terrorists is uniformly polarizing and absolutist.
	b.	"Us" versus "Them."
	c.	This is a striking consistency considering the diversity of causes that terrorists are attracted to.
	d.	Without nuance, without shades of gray.
	e.	"They," the establishment, are the source of all evil.
	f.	"We," the freedom fighters, are consumed by righteous rage.
	g.	If "they" are the source of our problems, it follows ineluctably, in the special psycho-logic of the terrorist, that "they" must be destroyed.
	h.	. . . "It is the just and moral thing to do."
3.	Personalities of terrorists
	a.	Post's own comparative research on the psychology of terrorists does not reveal any major psychopathology.
	b.	. . . "The outstanding characteristic of terrorists is their normality."
		1.	FLN in Algeria in the 1950s--Crenshaw's studies of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria in the 1950s found the members to be normal.
		2.	IRA--Heskin's (1984) review of the Irish Republican Army failed to show that members of the IRA were emotionally disturbed.
		3.	McCauley and Segal (1987) conclude that "the best documented generalization is negative; terrorists do not show any striking psychopathology.
	c.	But some personality characteristics are common. The evidence was derived from memoirs, court records, and rare interviews.
	d.	People with particular personality traits are drawn to terrorist groups.
		1.	action oriented
		2.	aggressive
		3.	stimulus hungry
		4.	seek excitement.
	e.	Theoretical interpretation about "splitting."
		1.	Not all, but many terrorists rely on the psychological defense mechanism of "externalization and splitting."
		2.	Splitting--according to the theoretical interpretation the personality is split into "me" and "not me."
		3.	According to this theory, these are individuals who have not integrated the good and bad parts of the self.
		4.	Idealizes one's grandiose self.
		5.	Splits out and projects onto others all hated and devalued weakness within the self.
		6.	According to this defense mechanisms, these individuals need to have an outside enemy to blame. Such blaming protects the self from self-criticism.
		7.	According to this interpretation, Hitler was an example of externalization and splitting. "He projected the devalued part of himself onto others and scapegoated the enemy.
		8.	According to Post, such people find the polarizing of absolutist rhetoric of terrorism extremely attractive.
		9.	The "Its not us; it's them" explanation particularly satisfying.
		10.	The Red Brigade terrorists in Italy were found to be lacking in gross psychopathology, but similar in personality characteristics.
4.	The lives of people drawn to the path of terrorism.
	a.	There are few studies, but the ones that have been conducted are convincing.
	b.	A great deal has gone wrong in the lives of people drawn to the path of terrorism.
	c.	A study of West German terrorists.
		1.	A study sponsored by the West German Ministry of Interior.
		2.	Examined the life course of 250 West German terrorists.
		3.	237 were left wing (Red Army Faction) and 23 were right wing (2 June Movement).
		4.	79% reported severe conflict, especially with parents (33%)
		5.	25% of the leftist terrorists had lost one or both parents by the age of 14.
		6.	The loss of the father was especially disruptive.
		7.	They described the father, when present, in hostile terms.
		8.	33% of the terrorists had been convicted in juvenile court
		9.	Generally, terrorists had a demonstrated pattern of failure both educationally and vocationally.
		10.	Terrorists were viewed as advancement oriented, but failure prone.
		11.	The terrorist career was a terminal point in a series of abortive adaptation attempts.
		12.	There was no control group, but the descriptions are consistent with clinical accounts of the Red Army Faction.
		13.	Supporting evidence from the ETA (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna or the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement).
5.	Relationships to parents and the regime.
	a.	An analysis by Post (1986) of "anarchic-ideologues" such as the Red Army faction in West Germany and "national separatists" such as the ETA.
		1.	A typology of terrorist ideologies.
				Parents attitude toward the regime
				Loyal	Disloyal
			Loyal toward parents	Did not become terrorists	Became nationalist-separatists
			Disloyal toward parents	Became anarchic-ideologues
		2.	In both the anarchic-ideologues and the nationalist-separatists, the act of joining a terrorist group represents an attempt to deal with a fragmented psychological identity.
		3.	Comparable data is not available for Shi'ite and Palestinian terrorists, but specialists who closely follow Middle Eastern terrorist groups share the impression that they come from the margins of society
6.	The Power of the group
	a.	Belonging to the terrorist group.
		1.	For many this may be the first time they truly "belonged."
		2.	For the first time they felt significant.
		3.	For the first time, they felt that what they did counted.
	b.	Pressures to conform.
		1.	"Group mind"--the tendency to submerge one's identity into the group.
		2.	The need to belong.
		3.	The strength of affiliative needs
		4.	An incomplete sense of individual identity.
		5.	External danger magnifies group cohesion.
		6.	Members of the Red Army Faction said that group solidarity was compelled by the illegal situation.
		7.	Extreme pressures to conform.
		8.	Doubts about the legitimacy of goals are intolerable to the group.
		9.	Doubts about the legitimacy of actions are intolerable to the group.
		10.	Withdrawal from the group was impossible "except by way of the graveyard."
		11.	The way to get rid of doubt is to get rid of doubters.
		12.	The first meeting of a new recruit to the Heidelberg cell of the Red Army Faction (described by Baeyer-Kaette). The group was discussing a plan to firebomb a major department store. Horrified, the new recruit blurted out, "But that will lead to loss of innocent lives!" A chill fell over the room, and the new recruit quickly realized to question the group consensus was to risk losing his membership in the gang.
		13.	Group ideology plays an important role in supporting this conformity-inducing environment. The leader of the cell patiently explained to the new recruit that anyone who would shop in such an opulent store was no innocent victim, but was indeed a capitalist consumer.
		14.	The group defines the moral code of its members.
		15.	Similar to charismatic religious cults, the more isolated and unaffiliated the new members, the more likely they were to hold firmly and unquestionably to their group membership--it was their sole support.
		16.	For example, the willingness of 1,410 members of the Unification Church to accept Reverend Moon's choice of a marital partner. . . assigned in a bizarre mass engagement ceremony in Madison Square Garden. Those who depended entirely on the cult for their sense of emotional well-being accepted Reverend Moon's selection without question.
7.	Pressures to commit acts of violence.
	a.	What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is the differentiation of the target of violence (the innocent victim) from the target of influence
		1.	That differentiation, however, is not interpreted by Post to indicate that political violence is instrumental. According to Post's analysis, it is not a tactic to achieve the group's political goals.
	b.	Post's position is that political violence is driven by psychological forces. The cause is not the cause!
		1.	Terrorist acts are rationalized by the group's ideology, but the group ideology is not the cause.
	c.	The central argument is that individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.
		1.	Consider a youth seeking an external target to attack. Before joining the group, he was alone, not particularly successful. After joining a politically violent group, he is engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the establishment. His picture is on the "most wanted" posters. He sees his leaders internationally prominent media personalities. Within certain circles, he/she is lionized as a hero. He/she travels first class. His family is provided for should his acts of heroism lead to his death as a martyr to the cause. This is heady stuff. Surely this is a "good life." A role and position not easily relinquished.
		2.	Zawodny (1978) studied underground resistance groups during World War II. He found that the primary determinant of underground group decision making is not the external reality, but the psychological climate in the group.
		3.	When a resistance group is forced to go underground, what emerges is unbearable tension. Forced inaction is extremely stressful to action-oriented people. What, after all, are freedom fighters for if they do not fight? A terrorist group needs to commit acts of terrorism in order to justify its existence. A wise leader, sensing tension, will plan an action so that the group's members can reaffirm their identity and discharge their aggressive energy.
		4.	The dynamics of a terrorist group presses for perpetuation of violence and ever-riskier decisions. A leader who advocates prudence and moderation is likely to lose his/her position quickly to a bolder person.
		5.	Post asserts that terrorist groups displays, in extreme degree, the characteristics of Groupthink, as described by Janis.
			a.	Illusion of invulnerability leading to excessive optimism and excessive risk taking.
			b.	Presumptions of the groups morality
			c.	One-dimensional perceptions of the enemy as evil
			d.	Intolerance of challenges by a group member to shared key beliefs.
		6.	Research by Semel and Minx (1979) with U. S. military officers as subjects found that groups regularly opted for riskier choices than those that would have been preferred by individuals.
		7.	Post was a member of the International Task for the Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism. The momentum toward ever-riskier choices has important implications for mass-casualty terrorism. Post sees internal constraints against the unthinkable prospect of nuclear terrorism weakening. The prospects for nuclear terrorism are increasing. A major contribution to that increase is the risk-increasing group dynamics of the terrorist group.
	d.	The threat of success.
		1.	If the cause were indeed the cause, should not its achievement lead to the dissolution of terrorist groups?
		2.	According to Post, on a number of occasions in the past Yasir Arafat could have placed major pressure on Israel and may well have achieved the beginnings of a partial solution to the Palestinian problem had he (a) divested himself of the radical left wing of the PLO and (b) accepted UN Resolution No. 242 acknowledging Israel's right to exist. But on each occasion, he opted to be leader of a unified Palestinian resistance movement, yielding to the radical left committed to winning their struggle through violence.
		3.	Similarly, on many occasions in Northern Ireland, on the threshold of a move to conciliation, another cycle of violence occurred.
		4.	For any organization, the highest priority is survival, especially true for a terrorist group. To succeed in achieving its espoused cause would threaten the goal of survival.
8.	Policy implications. Terrorists whose only sense of significance comes from being terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism for to do so would be to lose their very reason for being.
	a.	Terrorist groups differ in their structure and dynamics. Policies should be tailored to the specific group and understood in historical, cultural, and political context.
	b.	As a general rule, the smaller and more autonomous the group, the more counterproductive is external force. Counterterrorist force will unite the group and reduce its divisions. Left alone, these inherently unstable groups may self-destruct.
	c.	For a terrorist organization for which violence is defined as the only legitimate tactic for achieving goals, counterterrorist retaliation cannot intimidate.
	d.	For complex organizations with both illegal terrorist wings and parallel legal wings, internal organizational pressures cannot operate to constrain the terrorist wing. Basque separatists are an example.
	e.	For state-supported and state-directed terrorist groups, the group is a paramilitary unit under government control. Terrorism is being used as an equalizing tactic in an undeclared war. The psychological factors just discussed are not particularly relevant.
	f.	There is no short-range solution to the problem of terrorism. Once an individual is in the pressure cooker of the terrorist group, it is extremely difficult to convince him/her. In the long run, the most effective antiterrorist policy is one that inhibits potential recruits from joining in the first place.
	g.	Until now, terrorists have had a virtual monopoly on the weapon of the television camera. They manipulate their audiences through the media and perpetuate their audiences by shaping perceptions of future generations of terrorists.
	h.	Proactive policy must be (a) information and public education, (b) to de-romanticize the terrorists, and (c) portraying them for what they are.
	i.	Amnesty programs to facilitate pathways out of terrorist groups. The Italian government has found his to be highly effective.
	j.	Reduce external support. Discourage and interdict supplies and money.