The American Domino Theory Derived from a chapter by Betty Glad and Charles Taber (1990) Supplemented by theories and examples from social psychology
1.	Introduction
	a.	The domino theory is a metaphor--one of intermediate level of analysis.
	b.	Walter Lipman once observed that people base their decisions on the "pictures in their heads."
	c.	The real environment is too complex, too transient for direct knowledge.
	d.	Humans are simply not equipped "to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations. Humans experience information overload in complex situations.
	e	The images humans create enable the individual to distinguish "important" from "unimportant" information and give it meaning.
	f.	Humans are cognitive misers--a guiding principle in social cognition (psychology). All things being equal, most people will do the least amount of cognitive work they can get away with in situations.
	g.	Effects of being cognitive misers
		1.	Heuristics--simple decision-making rules we often use to make inferences or draw conclusions easily and quickly.
		2.	Biases--errors or distortions that often appear in social thought.
	h.	Vincennes incident as an example of being cognitive misers.
		1.	Stress--restricts the range of human judgment
		2.	Perception that the plane was descending--a bias effect
		3.	Overconfidence effect--a cognitive error that one overestimate's the accuracy of their beliefs and perceptions.
2.	Psychological purposes served by the American Domino theory.
	a.	The images, heuristics, biases, and overconfidence effect all have important ramifications for decisions to go to war.
	b.	Perceptions and understandings of a nation's place in the world and of its interests and the threats to the nation all function as culturally shared images.
	c.	When decision makers see their nation as the center of the universe--as dominant--it has important implications for policy.
	d.	But when decision makers see themselves as but one among equals, operating with a shared civilization, that has different ramifications. (Note: These words were written before 9-11-01)
	e.	That is, there are important implications upon decision-makers from one's position in the Balance of Power--see Chapter 13 of political science book.
	f.	Major powers are apt to see themselves as guardians of the system--based upon Dengerink and Levendusky. Should we trust these guardians?
	g.	System maintenance image. The American Domino Theory is an example of a system maintenance image--adaptation to the new role of the United States in the world political system after World War II.
	h.	The domino theory expanded the definition of American interests in the world and envisaged threats to those interests.
	i.	The domino theory did capture elements of a new reality. It also contained crude historical metaphors. It offered simplistic assumptions about the nature of human motivation and definitions of national interests which did not differentiate between central and peripheral concerns.
3.	Spring 1946
	a.	President Harry Truman asked the United States Congress for $400 million in military and economic assistance to counter communist pressure on governments of Greece and Turkey. President Truman argued that collapse of free institutions would be disastrous for the whole world.
	b.	Dean Acheson's explained this position with the metaphor--"like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the east."
4.	April 1950
	a.	Versions of the American Domino Theory were evident in discussions of Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff thought the fall of Indochina to communism would lead to an immediate threat to the internal security of the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia.
5.	June 1950
	a.	The invasion of North Korean armies across the 38th parallel was viewed as a confirmation of the fears of Washington policymakers. The invasion was viewed as Soviet inspired. One state department official used the metaphor that the relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea was the same as that between Walt Disney and Donald Duck.
	b.	For Harry Truman, it was essential that the United States response be tough and unambiguous. "If we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any next steps . ."
	c.	In Truman's Memoirs he used the metaphor of the axis of World War II. Communism was acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted. If communists were not stopped, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats by stronger communist neighbors.
	d.	After the attack on South Korea, a December 1950 CIA memorandum predicted disasters for Thailand, Malaya, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
6.	The Eisenhower administration believed the same image.
	a.	Eisenhower wrote Churchill in 1954 that if Indochina were allowed to fall, he did not see how Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia could be kept out of communist hands.
	b.	Three days later Eisenhower introduced the specific metaphor of "falling dominoes." America should support the French in Vietnam because of "what you would call the falling domino principle." "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly."
	c.	While briefing John Kennedy before leaving office, Eisenhower asserted that Laos was the key to all of Southeast Asia. In a speech before the American Friends of Vietnam in 1954, he saw the security of Asian countries"threatened" if the "red tide of communism overflowed into Vietnam"--a high tide metaphor.
	d.	When asked if he believed in the domino theory, Kennedy responded "I believe it; I believe it."
7.	In 1961 Vice President Lyndon Johnson argued that "We have to decide whether we are going to help these countries in Southeast Asia to the best of our ability or throw in the towel and pull back our defenses to San Francisco.
	a.	As president, he likened North Vietnam to Nazi Germany and proclaimed that a retreat from Vietnam would eventually lead to battles on the beaches of Waikiki.
	b.	As late as November 1967, Johnson's senior informal advisors were unanimous in their unqualified support of the domino theory.
	c.	. . . despite the findings of Clark Clifford that the leaders in the region were unanimous in rejecting the validity of the domino theory.
8.	Two years later, President Richard Nixon justified his refusal to withdraw from Vietnam in similar terms--it would spark violence wherever we were trying to maintain peace.
	a.	That's egocentric of U. S. leaders isn't it?
9.	For a short time after the end of the Vietnam war, the domino theory lost some of its power to shape American foreign policy decisions.
	a.	Richard Nixon in his second term, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter were more likely to use diplomatic means and find common interests in arms reduction.
10.	In Ronald Reagan's first term, the domino theory regained its prominence in decision-making.
	a.	Repeatedly early in his career he argued in domino terms
	b.	Reagan believed that the decision to limit the war in Korea encouraged communists to challenge in Laos and that the agreement to neutralize Laos in 1961 led to the communist challenge in Vietnam.
	c.	The 1980 Republican platform, reflecting Reagan's views, warned of the Marxist Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua and Marxist attempts to destabilize El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
	d.	The U. S. military incursion into Lebanon in 1982 was based upon the belief that civic conflict in Lebanon had its origin in Soviet support of Syria.
11.	Underlying assumptions of the Domino Theory.
	a.	The domino theory was a metaphor rather than a well thought-out explanation of reasons why the fall to communism in one area would lead to a fall to communism in another area.
	b.	A certain cause and effect was assumed.
	c.	The domino theory was seen as self-evident truth, not as a premise to be examined.
12.	Four basic assumptions of the Domino Theory
	a.	An aggressor nation will challenge powerful nations over peripheral, seemingly unimportant issues, testing their will to resist. Dean Acheson saw the communist invasion of Korea as a test of weakness or disunity. If weakness were detected, the the communist could exploit those weaknesses. Hitler could see that the Japanese militarists in Manchuria were not stopped. Hitler saw that Mussolini was not stopped in Ethiopia. By metaphoric reasoning, if the aggressor isn't stopped, the aggressor will advance more ambitious claims. The metaphor is falling dominos.
	b.	The reasoning was that standing up to an aggressor would cause them to back down. The metaphor in this case is school-yard bullies. Aggressors were assumed to back down to force. Lyndon Johnson said that one thing a bully understands is force and the one thing he fears is courage.
	c.	The assumption that the United States is the core power in the alliance of the free world. The U. S. must stand up to the Soviet Union to maintain the morale of its allies. If one nation is allowed to fall to the Soviet Union, other less powerful nations will lose faith in the will of the core power to protect them. To leave Vietnam would shake their confidence in the value of the U. S. commitment and the "deep and flowing springs of moral duty. The metaphor in this case is the permanent spring of water, an infinite source of moral support.
	d.	The assumption that revolutionary communism is simply a form of Soviet expansionism. Proxies such as North Vietnam and Cuba are used to foster the spread of communism. This is the metaphor of disease, the "spread" of communism. W. W. Rostov proclaimed in a 1961 speech "we are determined to help destroy this international disease, this guerilla war designed, initiated, supplied, and led from outside an independent nation. Communism will spread like an epidemic. By mere proximity, their agents make a society vulnerable. Later Jeane Kirkpatrick argued that revolutions are the result of violence perpetuated by Marxist-inspired leaders.
13.	Reasons for adoption of the domino theory
	a.	Partly because political decision-makers had drawn these metaphors from their readings of history. Harry Truman, for example, said that "lessons of history" offer clear guides to "right principles" of action. However, history offers many possible lessons--not just these metaphors.
		1.	Often learned images are based on dramatic and memorable events, occurring early in the decision-makers political life.
		2.	Most of the men playing key roles in the formulation of U. S. foreign policy after World War II experienced a very salient event--the Munich Conference. Neville Chamberlain's negotiation was viewed as appeasement that encouraged Hitler.
		3.	This was a formative phase of the political education in their careers. Lyndon Johnson and Harry Truman were in the U. S. Congress at the time. John Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, and Robert McNamara were in college. As they saw it, the Soviet Union was now acting as Hitler had. Hitler was a metaphor for the Soviet Union.
14.	What functions did the Domino Theory play?
	a.	It provided U. S. decision-makers with an image metaphor to explain their new world, after World War II.
	b.	The metaphor provided a diagnosis of the threat from the Soviet Union and simple prescriptions for dealing with the threat.
		1.	Simple prescriptions are appealing to cognitive misers
			a.	There is little reason, then, to look at local causes of discontent.
			b.	Little reason to look at the actual interests of the Soviet Union or China.
			c.	Little reason to analyze the complex relations among the communist powers and their allies.
			d.	The policy was pre-determined. The U. S. must take a hard line stand.
	c.	The domino theory also served immediate and pressing domestic, political, organizational, and psychological interests. The question is "Who benefits from the Domino Theory?"
		1.	It served the bureaucratic interests of decision-makers
			a.	George Kennan's long telegram from Moscow on 22 February 1946 about the inner dynamics of the Soviet System that Soviet expansionism could only be contained by counter force was seminal. This view was rapidly circulated around Washington suggesting that many top political and military leaders were predisposed to this view. Secretary of Navy James Forrestal sponsored Kennan to be the only civilian director of the newly established War College.
			b.	Other military officials viewed the domino theory as a way to extract money from Congress for carriers and bombers. By early 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked for increased military support from Congress.
			c.	The domino theory was useful to political leaders to win congressional and public support to extend U. S. influence in parts of the world where it had not been active. The Truman Administration had initial difficulty in obtaining congressional support for Turkish-Greek aid package. To win support, the administration began speaking in apocalyptic terms.
			d.	The domino theory met the career and psychological needs of the new civilian strategists who were dominating high-level decision making. The domino theory appeared to serve the advancement of their careers. They benefited from their association with the power and prestige of the United States. Thus the image of U. S. omnipotence served their interests. But how safe is it to reinforce a vision of the United States as omnipotent?
	d.	The Domino Theory may also be understood in terms of the broader proclivities of the U. S. culture.
		1.	The United States is inclined to use abstract principles for guidance in foreign policy decision-making. For example, the two-sphere concept of the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door and Territorial Integrity of China principles.
		2.	George Kennan observed in his Memoirs that "We like to find some general governing norm in which to appeal so that the individual decisions may not be made on their particular merits, but automatically. Once again the cognitive miser is operating.
	e.	These motives were divorced from fact. Those who promoted the Domino Theory were ignorant of well-known facts. For example, the Chinese revolution, the decade old rift between Moscow and Peking, and the fact that the Vietnamese had been fighting foreign invaders for almost 2,000 years.
15.	Evaluation of the validity of the Domino Theory
	a.	Certain aspects of the theory did accurately represent key features of the world after World War II. Consistent with the Balance of Power theorists who believe that countervailing power is the only reliable method for limiting ambition of expansionistic foreign nations.
	b.	The domino theory went beyond simple balance of power.
		1.	For example, the domino theory asserted that even minor interests must be met with commitments to preserve the status quo.
		2.	All interests are linked.
		3.	One cannot distinguish between vital and peripheral concerns.
		4.	The metaphor of spreading fires or diseases.
		5.	Even challenges to economic norms have been countered in these terms.
			a.	U. S. decision makers saw Latin American attempts to nationalize industries as a threat to the entire international legal structure supporting free enterprise.
			b.	When Mexico nationalized oil properties in 1938, the State Department pushed for limited economic sanctions. Secretary of State Cordell Hull warned, "Other nations will quickly follow suit."
			c.	The Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 mandated automatic cessation of economic aid to any country expropriating private property without speedy and adequate compensation. Otherwise warned one congressman, "A veritable prairie fire of confiscation would lay waste to American property rights throughout the world"--a prairie fire metaphor.
16.	Problems with the Domino Theory.
	a.	Far too simplistic
		1.	Does not distinguish between the motives of rational and non rational aggressors
		2.	Does not distinguish between unlimited imperialism and limited expansion for traditional national interests.
		3.	Glossed over the indigenous roots of revolutions and local wars.
		4.	Does not address the possibility that the United States could become over committed.
	b.	Misinterpretation of the Munich Conference.
		1.	Hitler was not testing the will of the Allies in 1938. Shortly before Munich, Hitler informed his generals that he had decided to sue force to solve the Czech problem that fall. His diplomatic maneuvers at Munich were designed to isolate Czechs so the German military could destroy them in a quick campaign.
		2.	Hitler was disappointed that he had obtained the Sudentendland (Su-Daten-Land) without a battle. He said Chamberlain spoiled his entry into Prague. Psychologically Hitler needed war. A deeply disturbed person, he had the political power to turn his fantasies into public reality.
		3.	Driven by the need to avoid any hint of weakness, Hitler could not back down. He valued obstinacy as an "essential masculine trait." The only way Hitler cold have been stopped in 1938 was through a military coup d'etat.
		4.	This is not to suggest that Neville Chamberlain cannot be faulted for legitimizing Hitler's seizure of Sudentendland.
		5.	The real issue at Munich was whether Great Britain should fight Hitler immediately or later.
		6.	By handing over a strategically important part of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, the Allies lost the greatest arsenal in central Europe.
		7.	On the other hand, the delay in the war did enable the Royal Air Force to equip itself with Hurricanes and Spitfires that enable them to win the Battle of Britain.
	c.	Simplistic views of the motives of the enemy
		1.	Based upon a simplistic view of motivation.
		2.	The U. S. interpretation of North Vietnam's infiltration into South Vietnam as a Russian test of the United States ignored 50 years of Vietnamese history and the role Ho Chi Minh had played as an anti-colonial nationalist. In the 1920's he had been known as the Nguyen who loved his country. His most impassioned essays dealt with the injustices of colonial rule.
		3.	The complexity of Soviet motivations was also misunderstood when American decision makers interpreted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as the result of failure of the United States to make deterrence threats clear. There is little evidence that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to test the United States. The Soviet Union was motivated by political and military instability that seriously threatened its influence in Afghanistan, a country that had been in its sphere of influence for some time.
		4.	U. S. decision makers saw the Soviet Union as simply responding to moves by the United States--an egocentric bias (a tendency for any group of human beings to see themselves as the central point of reference for others).
	d.	Problems with the Bully Metaphor--especially the assumption that the aggressor will back down. Bullies tend to react violently to the slightest threat.
		1.	Frustrating and noxious events tend to evoke hostility and aggression. The U. S. bombing of Vietnam lumber and rubber industries that people depended upon for a living were destroyed. Shrapnel and unexploded shells killed the Vietnamese who cultivated their land. Mosquitoes bred in the bomb craters. The Vietnamese came to see the United States as the enemy.
		2.	Threats are apt to evoke counter threats.
	e.	Simplistic view of the roots of revolutions.
		1.	Attributing revolutionary movements to international communism, the domino theory fails to discern local roots of discontent and local problems.
		2.	All the U. S.-backed governments that came to power in South Vietnam after the Geneva Agreements lacked both legitimacy and the will to make necessary reforms.
		3.	These governments were unrepresentative of the people they governed. In a predominately Buddhist society, their support came from Catholics.
	f.	Exaggeration of the Domino Effect and Counter Military Interventions
		1.	Overestimated the effect of revolutionary success on neighboring regimes. They missed looking for the exact links that might have that effect.
		2.	Policy makers need to look at specific vulnerabilities of specific regimes, not just falling dominos.
		3.	Interventions to prevent falling dominos are apt to have counterproductive results elsewhere. United States interventions in Southeast Asia contributed to the fall of Laos and Cambodia. Prior to United States involvement, these countries had little indigenous support for communism. United States control of the Royal Laotian Army with money and CIA support destroyed the neutrality of the government of Laos. United States diplomatic and military intervention in Cambodia contributed to the spread of the Khmer Rouge. The reign of terror of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979 led to the death from execution and starvation of two million people. Parents were killed in front of their children, brothers in front of brothers.
17.	Conclusions
	a.	Images and metaphors about the nature of the world and one's own position in the world play a central role in how decision makers define their interests, the nature of threats to these interests, and possible policy responses.
	b.	General metaphors such as the domino image provide poor guide to action.
	c.	Decision makers need to overcome the tendency to be cognitive misers. They need to evaluate changes in the world from the basis of fact specifically related to those events.
	d.	Metaphors are both useful and dangerous. The point is not that all metaphors are bad.
	e.	At one level of analysis, e.g. Peppers World Hypotheses, all human thinking is metaphoric.
	f.	Skilled decision making depends upon matching a fine-grained metaphor with the complexity and detail of the situation.